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Abstract
Predicting mass migration is one of the main challenges for policymakers and NGOs working with migrants worldwide.
Recently there has been a considerable increase in the use of computational techniques to predict migration flows, and
advances have allowed for application of improved algorithms in the field. However, given the rapid pace of technological
development facilitating these new predictive tools and methods for migration, it is important to address the extent to
which such instruments and techniques engage with and impact migration governance. This study provides an in‐depth
examination of selected existing predictive tools in the migration field and their impact on the governance of migratory
flows. It focuses on a comparative qualitative examination of these tools’ scope, as well as how these characteristics link
to their respective underlying migration theory, research question, or objective. It overviews how several organisations
have developed tools to predict short‐ or longer‐term migration patterns, or to assess and estimate migration uncertain‐
ties. At the same time, it demonstrates how and why these instruments continue to face limitations that in turn affect
migration management, especially as it relates to increasing EU institutional and stakeholder efforts to forecast or predict
mixed migration. The main predictive migration tools in use today cover different scopes and uses, and as such are equally
valid in shaping the requirements for a future, fully comprehensive predictive migration tool. This article provides clarity
on the requirements and features for such a tool and draws conclusions as to the risks and opportunities any such tool
could present for the future of EU migration governance.
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1. Introduction and Theoretical Framework
Migration is unpredictable. Since 2015, with the advent
of the so‐called “migration crisis,” different institutions
within the European context have allocated extensive
resources and funding in seeking migration forecast‐
ing or predictive tools (European Commission, 2021).
The main objective is to respond to the continual
demand for strategic and effective global migration gov‐
ernance (Robinson, 2018; Triandafyllidou, 2020).
Indeed, international migration flows have become
more diversified and globalised, and are notably marked
by increasingly restrictive admission policies, relative
change in labour market dynamics, issues of legal irreg‐
ularity and human trafficking, and new transnational
networks and spaces (Arango, 2018). Both institutions
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 133–145 133
and academia have identified different drivers that
could impact these migration flows (Castles et al., 2014;
Massey, 1999). Whereas some contend that factors such
as conflict, the economy, and climate are the main rea‐
sons behind a decision to emigrate, others hold that sud‐
den disruptive elements such as political events or social
unrest in a territory could lead to a decision to leave a
country (Carling & Collins, 2018; Raleigh, 2011). As inter‐
national migration flows are complex and uncertain, the
need for equally complex tools that help understand and
manage migration becomes imperative.
Meanwhile, incorporating algorithmic governance
has become common practice internationally, and today
new technologies are increasingly embedded in every‐
day decision‐making. The potential of computational
power can aid in addressing various gaps in understand‐
ing migration flows, and thus benefit policy. For exam‐
ple, new technologies enable, inter alia, conducting sub‐
national forecasts within international migration, con‐
sidering dimensions like labour force status and ethnic
groups, examining micro and macro factors involved in
international migration (by harnessing the potential of
micro models alongside macrosimulations), and simulat‐
ing sets of scenarios to understand migration drivers for
policy (Wilson & Rees, 2005, pp. 340–341). It should be
noted that from a temporal point of view, forecasting is
a process of predicting or estimating future events based
on past and present data, whereas predictions consist of
estimating the outcomes for unseen data (i.e., new or
test data); for the purposes of this article, the two terms
(forecasting and prediction) are used interchangeably.
Most importantly, however, the way international
migration governance is understood and practiced can
be mutually configured and shaped by technologies for
migration forecasting. In this sense, international migra‐
tion governance is a contested fieldwith competing inter‐
ests and stakeholders, and predictive tools exercise the
potential to introduce or reinforce unequal power rela‐
tions. In utilizing these tools, those stateswithmore tech‐
nological capabilities can further solidify their position
in setting the international migration agenda (Beduschi,
2020). Such tools can also be appropriated to further
securitize or bolster non‐entrée policies and human
surveillance, at the expense of those rights protected
by international human rights frameworks (Broeders &
Dijstelbloem, 2016). This is important to bear in mind
in seeking a truly effective global migration governance
oriented towards adequately benefiting all stakeholders,
especially migrants themselves.
In the case of the EU, efforts are underway to achieve
early warning of migratory movements, to forecast them
or to predict mixed migration flows in particular (Sohst
et al., 2020). Mixed migration flows are characterized
by their irregular nature (often in breach of regulatory
norms of countries of origin, transit, and destination),
and consist of distinct types of migratory populations,
including groups of refugees, asylum‐seekers, forced
and voluntary migrants, and others. Most recently, an
EU‐commissioned assessment concluded that a forecast‐
ing and early warning tool based on artificial intelli‐
gence (AI) technology evaluating the intensity and direc‐
tion of thesemixedmigratory flows is feasible (European
Commission, 2021). As the scope of this article por‐
tends to considering mixed migration flows in light of
addressing migration to the EU, it does not extend to
all predictive analytics or tools for humanitarian action,
although there are extensive, global efforts underway in
this regard (Hernandez & Roberts, 2020).
Within this context, this study analyses how existing
supranational predictive IT tools address these issues to
achieve effective migration governance in the EU. This
two‐fold inquiry first asks: What are the main predictive
migration tools and what is their scope? Here we focus
on identifying the variables and data sources used to cre‐
ate the tool models, as well as their underlying objec‐
tives and rationale, exploring how this relates to the gov‐
ernance of migratory flows to date in their respective
target countries. Additionally, this study further exam‐
ines how existing prediction or forecasting tools might
affect migration governance within the EU. Hence, the
second research question is: To what extent can these
existing tools facilitate effective migration governance?
In essence, this study seeks to provide a comprehensive
understanding of relevant past and current IT prediction
or forecasting tools formigration, as well as to determine
the extent to which such tools can offer improved migra‐
tion governance and policy solutions in the EU.
This study includes three main parts. Firstly, it
describes the qualitative methodology used for this
investigation. Secondly, it conducts a comparative exami‐
nation of three IT prediction tools or projects in the field
of migration. Lastly, it suggests what a valid prediction
tool for migration should include in terms of variables
of analysis, user interface, data accuracy, modelling, and
mechanisms for explaining and communicating predic‐
tions, in order to translate outputs into effective gover‐
nance policies.
2. Cases, Methodology, Data, and Categories
of Analysis
In order to answer the two main research questions,
we reviewed an extensive number of models, projects,
and tools with the potential to predict migration flows
arriving to the EU. The IT predictive tools were selected
from a 10‐year time range from 2010–2020. Originally,
in the analysis, we identified 18 tools and projects incor‐
porating AI, which were relevant for EU migration gov‐
ernance purposes. However, data were incomplete for
many of these, as some were no longer in use, further
information was not accessible, others were not predic‐
tive tools as such, or those responsible for tool operation
were unavailable for interview. As a result, we ultimately
selected three tools and projects that could be useful for
forecasting or predicting EU mixed migration flows as a
sample for this comparative examination:
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(1) the Jetson tool, funded and operated by UN High
Commissioner for Refugees;
(2) the Early Warning and Preparedness System tool
(hereafter EPS‐Forecasting), funded and operated
by the European Asylum Support Office;
(3) Foresight, currently funded and operated by the
Danish Refugee Council (DRC). It was initially
funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
with themodel and user interface developed in col‐
laboration with IBM.
It should be noted that the Internal Displacement Event
Tagging and Clustering Tool (IDETECT), funded and oper‐
ated by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
(IDMC), is also examined in‐depth in Section 4.1 below,
although this tool is not considered predictive as such.
Moreover, in listing the final selection of tools above, it
is equally important to signal that the Jetson project does
not describe itself as a “tool” as such, but rather a proof
of concept, as over the course of a year it conducted
scoping, research, and piloting, but never produced a
user‐facing, interactive tool. At the same time, as it uses
machine learning for predictive purposes, and pertains
to all of the categories of analysis, it is used here as one
of the selected “tools,” with these qualifications.
To answer the research questions, a qualitative ana‐
lysis has been carried out. The analysis used two types
of research techniques: document analysis and in‐depth
interviews. The document analysis provides access to
empirically objective, common, and reliable evidence
(Franzosi, 1998, p. 547). We focused on analysing all the
publicly accessible information published about these
tools, including user‐manuals, websites, reports, and aca‐
demic publications, totalling approximately 50 sources.
Regarding the interview analysis, two kinds of
in‐depth interviews have been conducted. We would
first highlight those carried out from February to March
2021, where we interviewed five experts on forecasting
or AI tools. The interviewees were selected according
to their expertise, using the snowball sampling method,
and included: the three developers of the forecasting
tools reviewed in this article, an IDMC representative
regarding the AI tool IDETECT, and the founding devel‐
oper of the Global Database of Events, Language, and
Tone (GDELT) project (which monitors the world’s broad‐
cast, print, and web news in over 100 languages). These
interviews first explored the scope of the different tools,
and secondly inquired as to what extent the existing pre‐
dictive tool or project was effective in predicting migra‐
tion for effective migration governance. Furthermore,
they informed the selection of the three tools for this arti‐
cle’s in‐depth analysis.
The other type of interview conducted included a
group interview with 13 representative European NGOs
specialising in migration and based in Bulgaria, Denmark,
Greece, Italy, and Spain, on 20 January 2021. The NGOs
were selected according to their expertise on the ground.
The main objectives of this interview were twofold:
firstly, to understand to what extent this kind of predic‐
tive tool can be useful for them as end‐users; secondly,
to learn what they would like and expect from this type
of tool.
These interviews enabled us to validate and com‐
plete the information examined via the document analy‐
sis technique (Corbetta, 2003), lasting between 40 min‐
utes and two hours. The interlocutors were all informed
about the purposes of our research and were given the
opportunity to review this work. The general sample has
been sufficiently representative to enable saturation and
triangulation of the information obtained.
We have predefined various categories of analysis to
improve the consistency of the research. As no previous
literature has identified these, we have extracted differ‐
ent categories from the data collected via an inductive
process. All the data collected via the document analy‐
sis as well as the interviews were systematically entered
into an Excel spreadsheet and organised by the different
categories according to the study’s two key objectives, as
Table 1 illustrates.
3. Comparative Analysis of the Existing Prediction Tools
This section focuses on the study’s first research ques‐
tion as to the main predictive migration tools and their
corresponding scopes. As explained in the methodology,
we analyse: (1) the Jetson tool; (2) the EPS‐Forecasting
tool; and (3) the Foresight tool. To carry out this compar‐
ative analysis, we identified four categories of analysis in
Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4: target migration flow, timeframe,
variables of analysis, and data sources.
Much of recent literature acknowledges that there
is no “one model as the ‘best model’ for all situations”
(Bijak et al., 2019, p. 12; Sohst & Tjaden, 2020). In fact,
using partial or different models with the same data
would produce different forecasts. Providing a compre‐
hensive forecasting tool entails assessing the type of
Table 1. Categories of analyses.
Comparative descriptive analysis (Section 3) Component of a valid predictive tool (Section 4)
Target flow Variables of analysis
Timescale User‐friendly interface
Variables of analysis Accuracy of migration data
Data sources Best suited model(s)
Source: Own elaboration.
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migration flow analysing the corresponding hard data
available, and cross referencing with varied contextual
data (qualitative and quantitative). Themodelling should
then be tailored to each of these different flows and
accompanying data to improve accuracy and minimise
potential bias.
As illustrated in Figure 1, none of these tools fore‐
cast regular migration, presumably because this infor‐
mation can be more easily obtained, as it can take
months to years in applying for admission to another
country. By contrast, irregular and forced migration can
either occur quickly via a sudden event, which could
be detected and signalled with an early warning system
in place, or over longer periods of time with varying
uncertain events that affect migration flows. The Jetson
project formerly predicted forced, internally displaced
people as pertained to the case study of Somalia.
Meanwhile, the Foresight tool focuses its forecasts on
only forcibly displaced asylum seekers and refugees from
a given country. Finally, the EPS‐Forecasting tool seeks
to anticipate flows of refugees and asylum‐seekers arriv‐
ing to the EU, which can be unpredictable if migrants
arrive via irregular routes. It should be noted that forced
migration is referring to migration that is not voluntary,
while a refugee or an asylum‐seeker is a legal term sig‐
nifying those individuals that lack protection from their
own country and are entitled to international rights or
protections. As Figure 1 demonstrates, while they are
distinct, sometimes these terms and concepts may over‐
lap or are combined in the migration flow being targeted
for prediction.
Modelling corresponded to the type of migra‐
tion flow under examination. The Jetson project used
machine learning gravity modelling and multivariate
time series analysis (a total of 11 modelling tech‐
niques), the Foresight tool uses machine learning and
Bayesian network models, and EPS‐Forecasting uses
adaptivemachine learning algorithms, further compared
in Section 4.4.
The types ofmovement to be predicted or forecasted
relate to how each of the tools have different predic‐
tion timescales, portrayed here in Figure 2. The Jetson
tool worked with both monthly predictions and addi‐
tional short time frames, including three‐month predic‐
tions, as they sought to test the assumption that sud‐
den conflict events or external factors like drought and
floods would cause populationmovement towards areas











Figure 1. Target migration flow by predictive tool. Source: Adapted from Carammia et al. (2020); R. Jimenez, Jetson project,











Figure 2. Timescale of the predictions according to each tool. Source: Adapted from Carammia et al. (2020); R. Jimenez,
Jetson project, interview, March 11, 2021; A. Kjærum, DRC interview, February 18, 2021; and C. Melachrinos, interview,
April 23, 2021.
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provides weekly predictions, as well as offers short‐term
predictions of up to one month that can be expanded
via a user‐selected variable. Finally, the Foresight tool ini‐
tially predicted mixed migration flows one to three years
in advance but was then redesigned (among other rea‐
sons) for better accuracy to focus on forced displacement
via one to three‐year predictions.
As displayed in Figure 3, these tools include differ‐
ent variables of analysis; this relates to how selecting
tool variables depends on the underlying migration the‐
ory or assumption, and the identified migration flows or
tool objective, further detailed in Section 4. The most
common variable, used by all three tools, is information
on violence or conflict in a particular territory, due to
a consensus that this represents one of the most influ‐
ential factors in migration flows. In addition, both the
JETSON and EPS‐Forecasting tools use information on
political events to feed their predictions. In particular,
the EPS‐Forecasting tool identifies political events and
social unrest, which could be caused by riots or rebellion
within a specific country or territory.
It is of note that both the EPS‐Forecasting and the
FORESIGHT tools take into account the area and/or
country of origin’s economy or governance to refine
their predictions. In addition, FORESIGHT uses data on
geological, hydrological, and meteorological events to
inform predictions.
Figure 4 shows that several data sources are used
for the predictive tools’ models. Here it is notewor‐
thy that Internet usage can assume an active role
in irregular migrants’ choices and routes (Lif, 2016).
The EPS‐Forecasting tool incorporates real‐time online
data sources in its predictions. However, none of the
tools incorporate data from social media platforms like
Twitter, Facebook, or Instagram; this is perhaps due to
an ongoing debate as to the ethical concerns behind use
of migrants’ personal data.
Figure 4 also demonstrates how all of the predic‐
tive tools rely mainly on open‐access data. When it was
in operation, the Jetson project used data from the
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED),












Figure 3. Variables of analysis included in each predictive tool. Source: Adapted from Carammia et al. (2020); R. Jimenez,






























































Figure 4. Data sources for the predictive tools. Source: Adapted from Carammia et al. (2020); R. Jimenez, JETSON project,
interview, March 11, 2021; A. Kjærum, DRC interview, February 18, 2021; and C. Melachrinos, interview, April 23, 2021.
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and Agriculture Organization of the UN, and the Somalia
Water and Land Information Management Project.
In addition to making use of GDELT, Google Trends and
Frontex data, the EPS‐Forecasting tool focuses on predict‐
ing asylum applications using their own weekly EPS‐Data
acquired from exchange with EU+ countries (EU mem‐
ber states and associated countries), the latter of which
provide data on 19 standardised, disaggregated indica‐
tors, or the EPS‐Data. A subset of those data is then used
for the EPS‐Forecasting tool (Albertinelli et al., 2020).
The Foresight tool utilizes 18 different sources of data,
with main sources including EM‐DAT, World Bank, the
Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, and ACLED.
4. Towards a Valid Predictive Tool for Migration
Governance in the EU
Following this brief comparison of three main predic‐
tive migration tools, this study fleshes them out further
and assesses the most relevant criteria in determining
what a valid predictive tool for effective EU migration
governance should look like. As such, this section par‐
tially responds to the second research question: To what
extent can those existing tools facilitate effective migra‐
tion governance? In particular, the following aspects are
analysed: necessary variables for the models, interface
of the tool, data and prediction accuracy, and adequately
suited models.
4.1. Necessary Variables to Be Included in the Tool
What follows is further exploration of how and why
to select variables and establish parameters for these
tools or their models, providing context for why the
tools analysed above did so. First of all, a valid pre‐
dictive tool should include variables of analysis related
to the demography of the selected countries of ori‐
gin. For instance, variations in population size within
countries of origin, transit, and destination can point
to the existence of migration flows in those territo‐
ries, and even provide data regarding migration routes.
There are many public sources of information that pro‐
vide quantitative data related to migration, including,
among others, population statistics (e.g., City Population,
2021; UN, 2021), number of displaced individuals (e.g.,
International Organization for Migration, 2020; OECD,
2020), number of asylum applications (e.g., Eurostat,
2021; UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020), and
main migratory routes (e.g., Frontex, 2020). Other rele‐
vant data sources could provide information on the given
theoretical drivers of migration, including armed conflict
and violence (ACLED, 2021), climate disasters (EM‐DAT,
2021; European Centre for Medium‐Range Weather
Forecasts, 2021), low levels of development (The World
Bank, 2021), food insecurity (Integrated Food Security
Phase Classification, 2020), irregular governance (Rulers,
Elections, and Irregular Governance, 2021), unafford‐
able food (Food and Agriculture Organization of the
UN, 2021), policy changes (European Country of Origin
Information Network, 2020), or other specific events
(GDELT, 2021). As illustrated in Figure 4, two of the three
tools studied here use the public dataset ACLED, which
offers the “dates, actors, locations, fatalities, and types
of all reported political violence and protest events” in
real‐time throughout the world (ACLED, 2021).
Additionally, a valid predictive tool working with
quantitative data could benefit from a monitoring team
that can simultaneously examine or provide qualitative
data to validate or correct the tool’s quantitative results.
An example includes the work of the IDMC, which oper‐
ates an AI tool and a real‐time monitoring platform as
part of its work in investigating displaced individuals
worldwide. IDMC enlists a team of about eight to 10
experts to monitor the raw quantitative data, ensuring
it corresponds to real‐time displacements.
Ideally, when assessing successful integration strate‐
gies, predictions of migratory flows should not only
include parameters related solely to countries of origin,
but also variables pertaining to the country of destina‐
tion, such as macroeconomic indicators (unemployment,
job vacancies) or migration and integration policies
(migration caps, visa regulations, etc.). This considera‐
tion is adequately incorporated into the EPS‐Forecasting
model, and Foresight tool developers also tested this
origin–destination relationship when initially looking at
mixed migration in its preliminary modelling. In using
such variables, both macro and micro synergies must be
considered to sufficiently address populations with mul‐
tiple characteristics.
Big data has demonstrated advantages in that it could
allow for identifying a particular phenomenon affecting
migration flows, can permit measurement of variables
at a regional or even local level, and provide input in
updating a corresponding algorithm (open‐access data
sources usually provide information only at the national
level). For instance, if a conflict occurs in a specific region,
this could be accurately measured by identifying users’
reactions in that particular location via social media.
In recent years, several universities and research centres
have been working with big data in forecasting displace‐
ment globally, examining social media for sentiment ana‐
lysis, and in evaluating economic and social variables
(European Commission, 2017; Singh et al., 2019). In this
sense, an ideal model could include behavioural and sen‐
timent analysis collected online. In utilizing data on sen‐
timent, for example, a tool could identify posts, “likes” or
interactions shared by migrants on their social networks,
which could then be properly anonymised (according to
the terms of the EU General Data Protection Regulation,
as further described in Section 4.2) and codified as
positive or negative reactions towards potential desti‐
nation countries, routes, and relevant migration topics.
Although several models that incorporate data on indi‐
vidual preferences and opinions have been proposed in
recent years (Alam et al., 2020; Papakyriakopoulos et
al., 2018, p. 9), there is no evidence that this type of
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data has been used to feed an actual predictive migra‐
tion mechanism to date. EPS‐Forecasting uses Google
Trends in generating their predictions, and a valid pre‐
dictive tool could similarly incorporate insight from pre‐
vious studies exploring how variables from “Google
queries” can predict migration flows (Böhme et al., 2020;
Lif, 2016).
Finally, a valid predictive tool could also benefit
from GDELT data, which provides real‐time, open source,
spatio‐temporal data sets on crises, drawn from the
world’s news media. The project codifies news and infor‐
mation about events via the (political science discipline)
Cameo system and provides a range of users with the var‐
ious methods with which to analyse this georeferenced,
globally contextualised data. As mentioned above, the
EPS‐Forecasting tool already uses GDELT data, selecting
a set of 240 events potentially driving migration and
displacement, divided into five macro‐categories (politi‐
cal events, social unrest, conflicts, economic events, and
governance‐related events).
4.2. Tool Interface and End‐User Involvement
Avalid predictivemigration toolmust be designed so that
its selected end‐users can easily operate it. In this regard,
we arrive at three main conclusions based on our analy‐
sis of the interviews conducted with 13 NGOs based in
Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Italy, and Spain.
Firstly, end‐users should be able to select and dese‐
lect the main demographic criteria. In this sense, at the
very least, an origin–destination–age–gender migration
matrix should be made available. In addition, potential
end‐users in our study find it relevant to have criteria
such as nationality, language spoken, ethnic group, and
skills of migrants. Although it would be ideal to include
all these criteria, concerns could arise in terms of data
protection and ethical requirements. Particularly, arti‐
cle 5(1)(c) of the EU General Data Protection Regulation
establishes that the processing of personal data must
be “adequate, relevant and limited to what is neces‐
sary in relation to the purposes for which they are pro‐
cessed” (European Union Regulation of 27 April 2016,
2016, p. 35). In essence, migrant’s personal data should
be processed at a minimum, only as needed for the pur‐
pose. In particular, as migrants meet the definition of
“vulnerable and minority groups,” any tool processing
their personal information should ensure that access to
this information is limited to specific selected end‐users,
and that this information access’ purposes comply with
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Secondly, according to the surveyed potential end‐
users, the interface of the tool could include interactive
user features like the potential to compare previous peri‐
ods, or scenario‐building capacities. For instance, users
find it particularly attractive if a tool can allow them to
break down migration to the EU by routes, and to iden‐
tify and visualise population groups according to spe‐
cific attributes.
Lastly, potential end‐users find it important that such
a tool could provide predictions automatically, without
having to rely on inputting their own data, which is often
insufficient or even non‐existent. In this regard, the tool
could have a mechanism in place via machine‐learning
techniques, or a human monitoring unit responsible for
updating information. Such a mechanism would guaran‐
tee, for example, that one year after the tool is opera‐
tional, predictions and functionalities of the tool remain
accurate, considering all recent phenomena impacting
migration flows.
To ensure the effectiveness of the tool, it is essential
to engage with experts or conduct pilot tests among end‐
users in real‐world environments, as part of the valida‐
tion process. Two of the three tools examined and still in
operation receive formal validation from in‐house versus
external users.
4.3. Accuracy of Migration Data and Predictions
While there are many sources of information, at the
same time the inherent uncertainty and complexity of
the migration phenomenon, and its study, present sev‐
eral issues with data. The first problem encountered
includes access: Given the nature of migration, as well as
the multiple actors involved, there may simply be a lack
of data, it could be incomplete, or it could be impossible
to obtain (Felkai Janssen, 2020; Kjærum, 2020). For exam‐
ple, as some of the events being anticipated are sudden
or unpredictable, a frequent possibilitywithmixedmigra‐
tion flows, the short life of the process makes data col‐
lection itself difficult. Another example includes how, ini‐
tially, Foresight sought to use household level informa‐
tion, but ended up using national level data, as obtaining
the former dataset was not feasible.
Moreover, raw data are not always accurate.
Although accuracy of migration data has improved over
time (Wilson & Rees, 2005, p. 339), some of this avail‐
able information can often be inconsistent or incomplete,
especially due to existing bias in the way data is collected
(for example, there is currently a lack of gender disaggre‐
gated information in migration research). Assuming that
data sources are sufficiently accurate, the next challenge
lies in achieving accurate predictions. Many scholars
have sought to minimise uncertainty through their mod‐
els and studies (Bijak et al., 2019; Wilson & Rees, 2005).
However, there is still a large margin of error and various
biases in migration predictions, due to events that are
very difficult to predict (Bijak et al., 2019). An example
includes the economic cycle of a country. Althoughmany
studies have aimed to identify vulnerable economies fac‐
ing risk in recent years (Brei et al., 2020; Stamer, 2019),
in general, economists are not always capable of accu‐
rately predicting country recessions (Thomson‐DeVeaux,
2020). Consequently, emigration driven by an economic
downturn is even harder to forecast.
In the last 10 years, manymethods have studied how
to explicitly identify errors (Wilson & Rees, 2005, p. 340)
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and improve predictions. One strategy for reducing high
levels of error includes assessing data sources according
to the concept of “true flow.” True flow is understood as
the number of migrants a flow would amount to accord‐
ing to a given definition of migrant, if immigration could
be monitored perfectly. Another strategy could focus on
assessing the margin of success by pulling everything
backwards (e.g., before 2015 in the case of migration
predictions), and looking at the ratio of error to the suc‐
cess of “past” forecasts. Through this method, themodel
could include benchmarking against the actual change in
migration flows fromone year to the next, or benchmark‐
ing against the previous prediction technique in place.
4.4. Best Suited Model(s)
Finally, it is important to recognise how lack of or errors
in data, as well as differences in conceptions and the‐
ories of migration, relates to how a tool is designed or
models should be chosen. The fact that a tool relies on
only one forecastingmodel could also lead to uncertainty
(Bijak, 2016; Disney et al., 2015), as any single model will
have only a limited number of variables. Even if a par‐
ticular model works well for a certain period, one sole
event might change everything, and from that point on
the predictive tool might have to consider a different
degree of uncertainty. Advocates for the advantages of
Bayesian models, a model used in Foresight, argue that
they theoretically can provide for the three elements of
uncertainty inherently characteristic to migration predic‐
tion: the uncertainty of future events, of migration data,
and of different forecasting models producing different
results. Moreover, the Bayesian approach can allow for
incorporating historical trends, expert judgements, and
various model specifications (Bijak & Wiśniowski, 2010).
Meanwhile, a gravity model like that used in the
Jetson experiments employs demographic variables,
using population size to map people over spatial dis‐
tance; this type of approach may offer insight into future
flows’ structures, rather than magnitude (Bijak et al.,
2019). In fact, it has been increasingly used in forecast‐
ing numbers of people who may want to move along
with their potential destination, as has been conducted
in aWorld Bank report exploring potential future climate
migration (Rigaud et al., 2018). Finally, the literature
has identified how agent‐based modelling approaches
in combination with machine learning are promising
to provide predictions based on indicators or decisions
to migrate at the individual or household level (corre‐
sponding to micro‐level theories of migration; Searle &
van Vuuren, 2021). These agent‐based models are often
used to explain migration, rather than predict (Klabunde
& Willekens, 2016).
As a way to mitigate the uncertainty of some of
the variables, model‐based estimations could be com‐
plemented by expert judgment. Experts are especially
necessary for assessing past forecast errors, identify‐
ing random variations in the models, enriching policy
debates, and offering long‐term perspectives. Both at
the EU and international level, scenario‐building consti‐
tutes a form of anticipating and preparing for future
migration patterns, or understanding alternative future
flows (Kjærum, 2020). This involves using models in an
explanatory capacity, with experts predicting how differ‐
ent scenarios affect the composition of migration flows
in a systematic process. However, disagreement among
such experts and the difficulty of providing actionable
conclusions complicates this method. A strategy to mit‐
igate lack of consensus and best incorporate expert opin‐
ion includes the Delphi survey, which surveys experts in
multiple rounds to reduce individual biases and promote
consensus (Sohst & Tjaden, 2020).
5. From Predictions to Policy
In addition to the considerations outlined in Section 4,
the feasibility and effectiveness of predictive tools and
projects for migration governance require extensive
assessment of who manages them and how. These new
technologies present a set of tools to understand and
anticipate migration, as the information they provide can
be analysed to inform long‐term, good governance efforts.
However, there are still several potential challenges and
gaps in first providing these tools for policymaking, and
then in translating predictions into policy decisions.
For one, economic and political considerations
remain inextricably linked. Policy makers may view eco‐
nomic costs as a barrier to even utilizing such tools
in the first place. This could be addressed by incorpo‐
rating open‐source data and engaging in resource and
knowledge sharing, as the Jetson project did by using
open‐source code and volunteer developers (R. Jimenez,
Jetson project, interview, March 11, 2021). Furthermore,
sufficient political will could assist in obtaining funds.
Still, the earlier described competing interests of migra‐
tion governance do present continued concerns with
political risk, and multi‐stakeholder collaboration is a
complicated negotiation. As a result, these tools may
remain for internal use by the developer and funder to
mitigate political sensitivities.
For example, while the EPS‐Forecasting algorithm is
both replicable and transparent, it remains internal in
compliance with the dissemination policy of some of
its data, which is provided in a two‐way exchange with
governments under the condition it is not used publicly
(Carammia et al., 2020). However, in addition to being
used by its initial, internal stakeholder, the Foresight
tool is also used by external stakeholders who have pro‐
vided positive feedback and is made available to other
stakeholders or governments (A. Kjærum, DRC interview,
February 18, 2021).
In all cases, translating the available and significant
wealth of analysis, information, and technological poten‐
tial to actual decisions formigration governance requires
continuous efforts towards enhanced communication,
participation, and transparency, as Figure 5 illustrates.









































Figure 5. From tool predictions to policy decisions. Source: Own elaboration.
To utilise the explanatory and empirical value of migra‐
tion predictions for governance, the nature of translating
research into policy necessitates both human analysis in
the form of a research team, as well as a policy unit or
team corresponding to a given tool, in order to ensure
the tool is useful for governance. In effect, while the tool
analysts and even invited outside experts make sense of
tool results, the engagement unit could serve as the liai‐
son with policymakers. The latter team can ensure infor‐
mation is provided in a palatable, non‐technical format,
as overly scientific explanations can ultimately not prove
useful (Albertinelli et al., 2020). Such an engagement or
policy team would also maintain an established link with
policymakers and stakeholders, so that the tool’s analysis
unit could communicate results in a two‐way dialogue.
For example, the European Asylum Support Office has
maintained such an ongoing, two‐way conversation and
engagement with EU+ countries that seek early warning
and forecasting of asylum seekers, and provides them
with up to date, limited release, comprehensive reports
regarding the state of early warning and forecasting to
date or the impacts of recent trends like the Covid‐19
pandemic; they are working towards a joint predictive
exercise among such stakeholders in 2021 (European
Asylum Support Office, 2017; C. Melachrinos, interview,
April 23, 2021).
Evidently, the dialogue between scientists and poli‐
cymakers is not simply a matter of submitting palatable
desk research resulting from the tool, and the proposed
engagement team’s role would mean organizing partici‐
patory, collective, ideally public, events like workshops,
focus groups, and webinars, where policymakers could
present questions and input. This transparency would
demonstrate the impact that this technology and data
offer, and it would act as a check on decision‐makers:
It would either monitor that they do not assert their
agenda or self‐interest in the direction of one tool or
monitor that they do not compare and select different
tools to simplymatch tool results to their desired policies.
Moreover, recent literature suggests that elites across
countries—including those drawing from the business,
media, and civil society in addition to those from govern‐
ment and research—are moderately open to and confi‐
dent in select global institutions (Scholte et al., 2021);
increased transparency and engagement with such elites
in this prediction to policy dialogue could in turn further
legitimise global migration governance.
Finally, the entire process of creating policies for
populations would be incomplete without visibility into
the lived experiences of migrants themselves, either
obtained by a tool’s analysis unit in tool design or inter‐
pretation of results, or by the policy team in engag‐
ing with decision‐makers. The Jetson project, for exam‐
ple, incorporated this at the analysis stage, conducting
qualitative interviews among the displaced individuals
being monitored, to validate variables utilized in running
their simulations.
Rather than reactive, short‐term decision‐making,
long‐term policy provision that incorporates interrelated
policy areas beyond those strictly related to migra‐
tion and integration measures are key (Szczepanikova
& Van Criekinge, 2018). For example, rather than solely
anticipating and preparing for migration in the short‐
term, translating migration predictions could mean
reforming or bolstering public health or welfare policy
for inclusive growth, as was indicated in this study’s
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interviews with relevant NGOs; in short, it is key to
account for all stakeholders in human mobility. Given
that migration governance should resemble a horizontal
process, the tool and its proposed units should engage all
relevantmultilevel governmental and non‐governmental
actors, including international organisations, EU institu‐
tions, states, regional or local governments, civil society
representatives, academic experts, and even the private
sector. Finally, such a long‐term view could mean also
engaging origin and transit countries, enacting a specific
policy or developing capacity‐building projects, rather
than focusing exclusively on host countries.
6. Conclusion
This study explores existing developments in predictive
tools for migration. After reviewing the literature and
available documents, following up with tool developers
and interviewing potential end‐users, three predictive
migration tools and projects were studied and compared,
namely, the Jetson tool, the EPS‐Forecasting tool, and
the Foresight tool. The analysis demonstrates the chal‐
lenges in providing for effective interaction and feedback
among tool developers and end‐users, and how each of
these tools has a different scope, data sources, models,
and validation mechanisms, according to their goals.
The discussion fleshes out the difficulties to date
encountered by those managing predictive tools in offer‐
ing predictions that could serve the totality of rele‐
vant stakeholders in their intent to develop strategic
migration governance (Robinson, 2018; Triandafyllidou,
2020). In illustrating this, the study emphasises fourmain
aspects that should be taken into consideration to create,
or transform a predictive tool into, a valid predictive tool
for effectivemigration governance. Thesemain elements
provided here include guidance on variables to incorpo‐
rate into themodels,ways to involve end‐users in the pro‐
cess, adequate levels of accuracy, and tailoringmodelling
to the prediction or governance objective. Furthermore,
mechanisms to convert predictions into policy decisions
were ultimately emphasized.
Again, there are unresolved challenges related to pre‐
dictive migration tools at all stages of the development
process: While some existing tools have managed to val‐
idate their predictions and achieve an acceptable level
of accuracy, others still struggle to obtain accurate pre‐
dictions even over a few weeks’ time. Even if this first
issue is overcome, the later stage of converting such pre‐
dictions into decisions for governance remains an ongo‐
ing process for all pre‐existing tools. The ultimate goal
of predicting migration flows for governance should be
to enable policymakers and appropriate stakeholders to
make prudent and robust decisions, by illustrating a clear
causal relationship between migrant arrivals and neces‐
sary policies for managing future migration. Section 5
explores this crucial step of engaging with policymak‐
ers, noting how it is essential to offer clear explanations
of comprehensive policy solutions based on the predic‐
tions, properly communicating the uncertainty of migra‐
tion forecasting.
Most importantly, the way international migration
governance is understood and practiced can be mutu‐
ally configured and shaped by technologies for migra‐
tion forecasting. The literature to date has pointed to the
risk of new technologies and IT predictive tools intensify‐
ing global or regional asymmetries, and curtailing human
rights, which is at odds with effective migration gover‐
nance (Beduschi, 2020; Broeders & Dijstelbloem, 2016;
Crépeau & Atak, 2016).
At the same time, this analysis of current predictive
tools and related projects has demonstrated that if devel‐
oped and operated in a transparent and accountable
process, such tools can alternatively be leveraged as an
equalizer in the field of migration management. Firstly,
knowledge and resource sharing via open source and
access can reduce costs or barriers that otherwise exac‐
erbate power differentials in global migration manage‐
ment. Secondly, these tools boast the capacity to incor‐
porate a broad and diverse range of actors—individual
states, intergovernmental organisations, civil society,
interdisciplinary researchers, and technical experts, as
well as migrants themselves—that can offer the most
comprehensive data and insight for effective governance.
In conclusion, this study indicates that there are cur‐
rently several initiatives underway in pursuit of an IT pre‐
dictive tool that could assist in migration management.
The EU and international organisations are working with
more data and insight than ever before understanding
migration flows for governance purposes. Nonetheless,
to render them both useful and relevant, predictive tools
require continual monitoring and re‐assessment, con‐
sistent and expanded multi‐stakeholder collaboration,
and further efforts toward sufficient communication and
translation of outputs, in order to better assist concrete
policy decision‐making and outcomes.
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